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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT- SEARCH AND
SEIZURE-TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
STREETS ACT OF 1968-ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE-COVERT EN-
TRY-The United States Supreme Court has held that the fourth
amendment does not require that a Title III electronic surveillance
order include a specific authorization for law enforcement officers to
covertly enter the premises described in the order to install a listening
device.
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979)
Pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (Crime Control Act),' federal agents, investigating a con-
spiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric, requested authoriza-
tion to intercept all oral communications' taking place in the office of
Larry Dalia.' The federal district court approved the application after
finding probable cause to believe that Dalia was involved in the com-
mission of various offenses,' that particular oral communications could
be obtained through the use of electronic surveillance, that normal in-
vestigative procedures appeared unlikely to succeed, and that the busi-
ness office of Larry Dalia was being used by him in connection with
the commission of the alleged offenses.' The court's order expressly
authorized special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to in-
tercept Dalia's conversations at his business office concerning the
alleged offenses for a period not longer than twenty days from the
date of the order.'
Although the surveillance order made no mention of the manner of
implementing the interception,7 the federal agents secretly entered
Dalia's office at midnight on April 5, and spent several hours on the
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
2. This request also sought an extension of a prior authorization to intercept tele-
phone conversations on two telephones in petitioner's business office. Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238, 242 (1979).
3. Id. at 242.
4. Id at 241-42. The petitioner was eventually indicted on five counts including: con-
spiring to transport, receive, and possess stolen goods; conspiring to obstruct interstate
commerce; transporting stolen goods; receiving stolen goods; and possession of stolen
goods. Id. at 244 n.5.
5. Id. at 242-44 n.4. These findings must be made prior to the issuance of any sur-
veillance authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976).
6. 441 U.S. at 242-44 n.4. The order conformed to the requirements specified in 18
U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1976) for the interception of any wire or oral conversation. See 441 U.S.
at 255-58.
7. See notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text supra.
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premises installing the bug.' All electronic surveillance ended on May
16, 1973' at which time the federal agents reentered Dalia's office and
removed the listening device.'" Dalia was indicted based upon the evi-
dence obtained from the intercepted communications."
Prior to trial, Dalia moved to suppress all evidence procured
through the use of the listening device installed in his office. The
court denied the motion without prejudice to its renewal following
trial." The petitioner was subsequently convicted," and his motion to
suppress the evidence was again denied at a post-trial evidentiary
hearing. 5 The district court noted that since the warrant was based
upon probable cause, the question was whether or not the manner of
executing the warrant was unreasonable.' In determining that the
manner of execution was not unreasonable, the district court found
that surreptitious entry was the safest and most successful method of
accomplishing the installation." The court reasoned that in most cases,
breaking and entering was the only way a listening device could be in-
stalled. Moreover, the authorization for covert entry was implicit in
the wiretapping since entry to install bugging devices was a condition
precedent that must necessarily have been satisfied if the purpose of
the intercept order was to be effectuated. 8 The district court thus
found that the surveillance order did not have to contain express
authorization for the covert entry.'
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court.' Although the court of ap-
peals agreed that separate authorization for the entry was not re-
quired, it noted that the preferable approach for surveillance applicants
was to include a statement of the need for a surreptitious entry in the
8. 441 U.S. at 245.
9. The electronic surveillance order of April 5th was extended by court order on
April 27, 1973. Id. at 242.
10. Id. at 245.
11. Id. See also note 4 supra.
12. 441 U.S. at 245.
13. Id
14. Id. at 246. Petitioner was convicted of receiving stolen goods and of conspiring to
transport, receive, and possess stolen goods. Id. at 245 n.6.
15. Id. at 246. The district court rejected the petitioner's assertion that an applicant
for an interception order must request court approval to break and enter for the purpose
of installing a bug. The petitioner argued that the authorizing court should ascertain if
the authorized surveillance could be accomplished in a less intrusive manner. United
States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 865-66 (D.N.J. 1977).
16. 426 F. Supp. at 865.
17. Id. at 866.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978).
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initial request whenever such break-in was contemplated." The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari' to decide whether courts
can authorize electronic surveillance that requires covert entry for in-
stallation of a listening device and whether such an order must
specifically authorize a covert entry.' The Court held that the fourth
amendment did not prohibit per se covert entries,"' and that no explicit
authorization for such an entry was required. Therefore, the decision
of the court of appeals was affirmed. 5
Justice Powell, writing the opinion for the majority," initially dis-
missed the petitioner's contention that the fourth amendment' pro-
hibits covert entry of private premises in all cases.' Relying on its
previous decisions in Irvine v. California" and Silverman v. United
21. Id. at 1346-47.
22. 439 U.S. 817 (1978).
23. 441 U.S. at 240-41.
24. Id at 248.
25. Id at 259.
26. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined in the
majority opinion. Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, concurred in the majority result
that covert entries are not prohibited per se by the Constitution but dissented from that
portion of the majority opinion which held that covert entries are authorized by Title III
and that no express authorization is required for the covert entry. Id. at 259 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stewart joined with Justice Brennan
except for Brennan's concurrence in the facts. Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Bren-
nan and Marshall, dissented from the majority's holding that Title III authorizes covert
entries. Id at 262 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
28. 441 U.S. at 246-48. Dalia argued that Title III was unconstitutional insofar as it
enabled courts to authorize covert entry for the installation of bugging devices. Id.
29. 347 U.S. 128 (1954). Irvine involved a covert entry by police officers into a home
without a warrant to install a bug. The Court held that the covert entry into the private
residence of an individual without a search warrant was a trespass and was, therefore, un-
constitutional. Id. at 132. The trespass doctrine had originated with Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which was the Court's first wiretap case. The Court in
Olmstead held that wiretaps were not prohibited by the fourth amendment unless there
was an actual physical intrusion onto the premises. Congress responded to this ruling by
enacting the Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976) which pro-
hibited the unauthorized interception of private conversations carried by wire or radio.
The first bugging case to reach the Court was Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942). Applying the Olmstead rationale, the Court found that the placing of a device
against a wall to hear conversations in the next room did not violate the fourth amend-
ment since there was no physical trespass. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
the Court finally discarded the trespass doctrine. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text
infra.
Duquesne Law Review
States,' the Court reasoned that it had previously implied that in
some circumstances covert entry to install electronic bugging devices
would be constitutionally acceptable if done pursuant to a search war-
rant.' Additionally, the Court found no basis for a constitutional rule
proscribing all covert entries since it was well established that officers
can constitutionally break and enter to execute a search warrant if
such an entry is the only means to execute the warrant." The peti-
tioner's argument that a property owner's lack of prior notice of the
entry made a covert entry unconstitutional was likewise dismissed by
the majority' based upon the Court's decision in Katz v. United
States." Moreover, the Court found that post-search notice to those
subject to surveillance' was a constitutionally adequate substitute for
advance notice.' Thus, the Dalia Court held that the fourth amend-
ment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the pur-
pose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.37
Justice Powell next addressed the issue of whether Title III was in-
tended by Congress to confer upon the courts the authority to approve
covert entries for the purpose of implementing a surveillance order."
The majority conceded that Title III did not refer explicitly to covert
entry. However, Justice Powell believed the language, structure, and
history of the statute led to the conclusion that Congress did intend to
give courts the authority to approve covert entries. 9 The Court
30. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In Silverman, police officers had inserted a "spike mike"
several inches into a party wall in order to intercept oral conversations. The Court ap-
plied the Olmstead trespass doctrine in finding this conduct to be a search subject to the
warrant clause. The Silverman Court noted that the Court had never held that a federal
officer may without warrant and without consent, physically entrench in a man's office or
home and subsequently relate what was seen or heard. Id. at 511-12.
31. 441 U.S. at 247.
32. Id. at 247-48.
33. Id. at 248.
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court had noted that such an announcement was
not required if it would result in the escape of the suspect or the destruction of evidence.
Id at 355 n.16.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976).
36. 441 U.S. at 248.
37. Id.
38. The federal courts of appeals were in conflict on the resolution of this issue. For
decisions that Title III authorized court approved covert entries, see United States v.
Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978); Application of United
States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
For decisions to the contrary, see United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded mem., 99 S. Ct. 2047 (1979); United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453
(9th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded mem., 99 S. Ct. 2155 (1979); United States v.
Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
39. 441 U.S. at 249.
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reviewed the comprehensive nature of Title III and noted that the
detailed restrictions of section 802 of the Crime Control Act'" insure
that bugging occurs only after a judicial determination that the elec-
tronic surveillance is needed.' The Dalia Court emphasized that once
the requisite need was found, the courts were granted broad authority
to approve electronic surveillance.' The only express limitation upon
this authority was that the order must provide that it is to be ex-
ecuted as soon as practicable and in a manner that minimizes the in-
terception of irrelevant conversations." The Court also stated that the
legislative history of Title III indicated that Congress realized that
most bugging requires covert entry." In light of this congressional
awareness, the Court decided that it would be erroneous to assume
that Congress attempted to exclude covert entries simply by remain-
ing silent on the issue."5 Furthermore, the Court stated that if covert
entries were not within the scope of Title III, the congressional pur-
pose in enacting the statute would be largely thwarted. The Court
reasoned that limited surveillance was permitted by Congress to
enable law enforcement authorities to successfully combat certain
forms of crime, but absent covert entry almost all electronic bugging
would be impossible.'"
After concluding that Congress had conferred upon the courts the
power to authorize covert entries, the majority considered the peti-
tioner's contention that the fourth amendment required explicit judi-
cial authorization of the entry before it took place.' 7 The Court stated
that the fourth amendment, when read literally, set forth three re-
quirements. These guidelines were that warrants must be issued by a
neutral disinterested magistrate;" those seeking the warrant must
demonstrate to the magistrate that probable cause exists to believe
that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or con-
viction for a particular offense;'9 and that warrants must particularly
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1976). See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
41. 441 U.S. at 249. The Court noted that not only must the issuing magistrate deter-
mine that there is a likelihood that the interception will disclose the needed evidence, but
he must also specify the exact scope of the surveillance to be undertaken, enumerating
the parties whose conversations are to be seized, the place to be bugged, and the agency
that will implement the order. Id at 249-50.
42. Id. at 250.
43. Id. at 250-51 n.11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
44. 441 U.S. at 251. The Court cited testimony before congressional subcommittees
which established that a covert entry was required in most bugging operations.
45. Id. at 251-52.
46. Id. at 252-54.
47. Id. at 254-55.
48. Id. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977); Shadwick v. City of
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971).
49. 441 U.S. at 255. See Wamden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).
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describe the things to be seized.' The Court stated that beyond these
three requirements, nothing in the language of the fourth amendment
nor in the Court's decisions interpreting that language suggested that
a warrant must specify the precise manner in which a search and
seizure is to be executed."1 The Court ruled that nothing in its prior
decisions indicated that officers requesting a warrant were constitu-
tionally required to set forth the anticipated means for executing the
warrant, even in cases where the officer knows beforehand that forced
entry would be necessary.
52
Finally, the Court rejected petitioner's argument that warrants ex-
ecuted by covert entry were unique since they entailed two distinct in-
vasions of privacy-the entry itself and the subsequent overhearing of
the conversations." The majority noted that police often find it neces-
sary to interfere with privacy rights which were not explicitly con-
sidered by the magistrate. The Court stated that it would extend the
warrant clause to the extreme if the courts were required to specify
methods of execution any time that fourth amendment rights were
likely to be affected in more than one way. Moreover, such an interpre-
tation is unnecessary since the manner in which a warrant is executed
is subject to later judicial review as to its reasonableness. The Court
concluded that nothing would be gained by requiring a magistrate to
expressly authorize a covert entry when it is unquestionably implicit
that a surreptitious entry may be necessary for the installation of the
bug. Thus, the Court held that the fourth amendment does not require
that a surveillance order contain an explicit authorization for a covert
entry."
Justice Brennan dissented.55 He contended that breaking and enter-
ing for the purpose of installing an electronic surveillance device was
an invasion of privacy of constitutional significance distinct from that
which attends nontrespassory surveillance. 5" In support of this position,
he stated that surveillance may be executed without a covert entry
and that when such an entry occurs it impinges upon both the physical
and conversational privacy of the occupant. Moreover, the practice
of breaking and entering to install surveillance equipment was particu-
larly intrusive and subject to police abuse. To Justice Brennan, these
additional intrusions mandated that the surveillance order also contain
explicit authorization for the covert entry. This would not amount to a
50. 441 U.S. at 255. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
51. 441 U.S. at 257.
52. I& at 257 n.19.
53. Id. at 257-58. See also Brief For Petitioner at 25.
54. 441 U.S. at 258-59.
55. Id at 259 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 259-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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requirement that the precise means of implementing the order be
specified, as the warrant need only state that a covert entry may be
utilized."' He contended that this requirement would not amount to
mere formalism since unnecessary and improper intrusions may be pre-
vented."
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority's conclusion that Title
III was intended to authorize covert entries, and rejected the majority's
finding of such authority since the statute did not expressly grant it.5'
He emphasized that until Congress stated otherwise, the Court's duty
to protect the rights of individuals should take precedence over the in-
terest in more effective law enforcement." In addition, Justice Stevens
viewed the structural detail of the statute as precluding the majority's
reading that silence on the issue implied authorization of covert entry.
Finally, he noted that the legislative history of Title III affirmatively
demonstrated that Congress never contemplated the Dalia situation."'
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that absent an express grant of
authority, it should be presumed that covert entries were prohibited."
The United States Supreme Court has frequently recognized that
the basic purpose behind the fourth amendment is to protect individ-
uals from arbitrary governmental intrusions," and it has been said that
physical entry into the home is the primary intrusion against which
the language of the fourth amendment is directed." It is a historical
fact that for nearly forty years prior to the Court's decision in Katz v.
United States,' the distinction between legal and illegal electronic
seizure turned upon whether an officer, acting without warrant, had
either physically entered the premises or placed a mechanical device in
a manner that physically intruded onto private premises." Thus, prior
to Katz, electronic surveillance was constitutional provided it was not
accomplished by an unauthorized physical intrusion.'
In Irvine v. California," the first pre-Katz bugging case to reach the
Court involving an actual warrantless physical trespass" by an officer
57. Id. at 260-61 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 261-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Id. at 263-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 264-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 267-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id at 278-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
64. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
65. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
66. See J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 13 (1978).
67. See notes 29 & 30 supra.
68. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
69. See note 30 supra.
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onto private premises, the Court held that few police measures more
flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental prin-
ciple declared by the fourth amendment. 0 Subsequently in Silverman
v. United States,1 although no physical entry by the police was in-
volved, the Court held that the insertion of a "spike mike" into an
adjoining wall of the subject premises intruded upon fourth amend-
ment protections. Additionally, the Silverman Court noted that it had
never held that an officer may, without warrant and without consent,
physically intrude into a person's office or home and secretly observe
their private life or listen to their conversations." Thus, in both the
Silverman and Irvine decisions, the Court recognized that physical en-
try into the sanctity of one's home is a particularly intrusive activity
and that the chief concern of the fourth amendment is the prevention
of such an intrusion. This line of cases exemplifies the judicial perspec-
tive prior to 1967 that only physical intrusions required authorization
and that the seizure of oral conversations was not unconstitutional ab-
sent unwarranted physical entry."'
In Katz, the Court overruled the "trespass" doctrine"5 and held that
the constitutionality of a search and seizure does not depend solely
upon the presence or absence of physical intrusion into a given en-
closure." Instead, the scope of the fourth amendment was read to pre-
clude intrusions into the privacy upon which an individual justifiably
relies." Thus, electronically listening to and recording an individual's
conversation, irrespective of the occurrence of a physical entry into a
given area, required court authorization if the particular intrusion
violated the conversational privacy upon which the individual had
justifiably relied. However, there was no indication in Katz that the
decision was intended to diminish the fourth amendment protection
consistently afforded an individual's home. The intent of the Court was
to ensure that the fourth amendment protected a person's private con-
versations as well as his private premises."' After Katz, an unwar-
70. 347 U.S. at 132.
71. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See note 31 supra.
72. 365 U.S. at 511-12.
73. Id at 512.
74. See notes 29 & 30 supra.
75. See note 29 supra.
76. 389 U.S. at 353.
77. Id at 352-53.
78. In Katz, the Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." 389 U.S. at 351. This choice of words led one commentator to observe:
The only merit in this comment is in its brevity. Of course the amendment is for
the benefit of the people, not places. But it may protect peoples' places and prop-
erties -"houses, papers, and effects," in the language of the amendment-even
when people are not in them or in immediate possession of them, and it may pro-
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ranted physical intrusion onto private premises or an unwarranted
invasion of conversational privacy upon which an individual justifiably
relied were unconstitutional.
An analysis of the Supreme Court precedents and of the underlying
policies"9 of the fourth amendment leaves little doubt that the covert
entry involved in Dalia should not have been viewed simply as a mode
of executing a valid surveillance order." The surreptitious entry into
Dalia's office was an invasion of privacy of constitutional significance
separate and distinct from that which attends electronic surveillance.
The eavesdrop in Dalia did more than compromise personal privacy, as
the surreptitious entry created the additional risk of injury, violent
confrontation, and police abuse, all of which the fourth amendment was
designed to prevent.8 '
As a constitutionally distinct invasion of privacy, a covert entry to
install listening devices should require separate judicial authorization
and should not be implied from the surveillance order. The fourth
amendment requires that searches be as limited as possible. ' Further-
more, the limits of those searches which are found necessary must be
set forth in the warrant" so that the officer executing the warrant can
determine the exact scope of his authority." This specification pre-
vents a general rummaging about in the private premises." It follows
then that a warrant expressly authorizing only the interception of oral
conversations should not be read to authorize a covert entry at the
discretion of the executing officer. Rather, the fourth amendment re-
quires that the necessity for the covert entry of the home be decided
by a neutral and detached magistrate," properly notified of the need
for such intrusion, ' and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion con-
templated."
tect people themselves- i.e., "persons" -more fully when they are in one place than
another.
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 112-13 (1969). In Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court rejectel the argument that Katz, by holding
that the fourth amendment protected persons and their private conversations, withdrew
any of the protection the amendment extended to thle home. Id. at 180.
79. See notes 63 & 64 and accompanying text supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 32 & 51 supra.
81. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57-58 (1964) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
83. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394 n.7 (1971);
United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1976).
84. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
85. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196-97 (1927).
86. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407
U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
87. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 354.
88. Id See also note 92 infra, which shows that a covert entry is contemplated well
in advance of the actual execution of the surveillance order.
1980
Duquesne Law Review
Although it is true that police officers executing a warrant often
find it necessary to intrude upon areas of privacy not explicitly con-
sidered by the judge issuing the warrant, the Court failed to distin-
guish the cases relied upon as cases involving situations where there
was no preconceived plan to engage in the additional intrusion and the
need for the additional intrusions could not have been supported or an-
ticipated with any degree of certainty at the time the warrant was
issued." In each case the need for the additional intrusion arose at the
time the officer attempted to execute the warrant; thus, it would have
been unreasonable to require the officer to seek authorization for the
additional intrusion." On the other hand, in a Dalia type electronic
surveillance operation, the decision to covertly break into a home for
the purpose of installing a listening device is made well in advance of
the actual execution of the surveillance order and the facts required to
show the need 1 for the additional intrusion are available well in ad-
vance of the actual execution." Electronic surveillance implemented by
covert entry is not a case where "it is reasonably likely that Fourth
Amendment rights may be affected in more than one way." 93 By defini-
tion, an electronic surveillance implemented by covert entry is a
planned event where the officer engages in conduct which is con-
templated well in advance, knowing that the additional intrusion will
occur. Unlike the factual situations present in the cases relied upon by
the majority, there is absolutely no spontaneity involved in a covert
entry, and consequently, there is no danger that the search will be
frustrated by requiring judicial authorization.
89. 441 U.S. at 257-58. The Court relied upon United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). and United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). In Cravero, the officer executing an arrest war-
rant was forced to enter into a man's home to make the arrest while in Gervato, circum-
stances necessitated that the officer executing a search warrant break the locks of the
building to be entered.
90. See note 89 supra.
91. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Court recognized the inherent
danger of electronic surveillance activities when accomplished by covert entries. The
Court indicated that in order to engage in a covert entry to install a listening device the
officer requesting the warrant to seize oral conversations must show that a covert entry
is necessary because other surveillance methods are likely to fail. Id. at 60.
92. In order that electronic surveillance activities may be successful, law enforcement
officials must make extensive internal and external surveys of the target in order to make
an informed judgment as to the time and manner of entry. See McNamara, The Problem
of Surreptitious Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed After
the Court Says "Yes"?, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977). The extensive nature of pre-
surveillance activities indicates that although the specific manner of entry may not be
decided until the last minute the magistrate would have time to make an informed deter-
mination whether a covert entry was necessary at all.
93. 441 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added).
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The Dalia decision raises the fundamental question of the extent to
which police practices should be fractionalized in terms of privacy in-
terests that are affected so as to warrant separate judicial considera-
tion. Given the Supreme Court's own distinctions represented by the
Irvine, Silverman, and Katz decisions, the interests affected by physi-
cal entry are sufficiently separate and distinct from those affected by
surveillance as to require separate consideration. Nevertheless, the
majority in Dalia treats the covert entry merely as a manner of ex-
ecuting a valid surveillance order, thereby concluding that separate
consideration by a neutral magistrate is not required. Dalia represents
a marked departure from the Supreme Court's historical treatment of
physical entry into the home and electronic eavesdropping as repre-
sented by Irvine, Silverman, and Katz. These prior rulings generously
protected the home from physical intrusion, and should have dictated a
result contrary to Dalia's sacrifice of individual fourth amendment pro-
tection in the name of expedient law enforcement.
Gregory R. Lyons
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